

From: "Butner, Gary (CDPH-RHB)" <Gary.Butner@cdph.ca.gov>
To: <susan.durbin@doj.ca.gov>
Date: 8/12/2008 12:34 PM
Subject: FW: Draft Summary of Today's "Lessons Learned" Meeting on the Cobalt-60 Shipment

-----Original Message-----

From: Greger, Robert (CDPH-DFDRS-RHB)
Sent: Thursday, July 10, 2008 7:03 AM
To: Butner, Gary (CDPH-RHB)
Subject: FW: Draft Summary of Today's "Lessons Learned" Meeting on the Cobalt-60 Shipment

Another email for Brian Hembacher.

-----Original Message-----

From: Barbara Byron [mailto:Bbyron@energy.state.ca.us]
Sent: Tuesday, November 12, 2002 3:27 PM
To: RGreger@dhs.ca.gov
Cc: EBailey@dhs.ca.gov
Subject: RE: Draft Summary of Today's "Lessons Learned" Meeting on the Cobalt-60 Shipment

Good comments. I'll make the changes. Thanks!

>>> "Greger, Robert (DHS-RHB)" <RGreger@dhs.ca.gov> 11/08/02 10:35AM >>>
Thanks for putting this summary together so promptly, while I could still remember what occurred in the meeting.

I have just a couple of comments on your excellent summary.

I think that instead of "DHS said that the two trucks should not have been allowed to park just anywhere awaiting the outcome of the dock strike" we tried to say that "an important factor in selecting the extended parking locations for the trucks is the surrounding population density due to the possibility for terrorist acts against the parked vehicles." I'm not sure exactly what we said, but that is what we should have said.

WRT the sentence "DHS, however, pointed out the need for a reciprocal relationship between DOE and the States on safe parking locations, since at times DOE may need to park DOE shipments at state facilities", could we instead say "DHS encouraged DOE and State cooperation on providing safe-haven locations for shipments such as these as well as DOE shipments such as WIPP shipments."

WRT the item "DHS recommended that criteria for "off normal" shipments include: (a) accidents or incidents involving greater than highway-route-controlled quantity (HRCQ) radioactive material shipments; (b)

significant delays (greater than 8 hours?) of an HRCQ shipment; and
(c)
shipments that have had significant media attention or notoriety," I
think
that we'd rather say that "DHS noted that criteria for "off normal"
shipments can not be clearly defined in all cases, but recommended that
in
addition to actual releases of radioactive materials, should include
situations in which the probability for releases are increased, where
the
probability for terrorist acts are increased, or where there is
increased
potential for public or media awareness of such shipments which could
lead
to increased public concern over the shipments. DHS recognizes that
these
criteria are subjective, and would rather err on the side of
over-notification."

-----Original Message-----

From: Barbara Byron [mailto:Bbyron@energy.state.ca.us]
Sent: Thursday, November 07, 2002 1:59 PM
To: JMcEnulty@chp.ca.gov; RGreger@dhs.ca.gov; carr6@llnl.gov
Cc: Bob Therkelsen; Jim Boyd; Steve Larson
Subject: Draft Summary of Today's "Lessons Learned" Meeting on the
Cobalt-60 Shipment

Thank you for participating in this morning's meeting on the cobalt-60
shipment from Canada. For your review and comment, below is a brief
summary
of our meeting. Before I begin with the summary, I just wanted to say
what
a pleasure it is working with all of you. We couldn't ask for a better
group of people for working through issues.

The meeting was held November 7, 2002, and included representatives from
the
CHP, DHS, OES, CPUC-Rail Safety, DOE-Oakland and LLNL. The purpose of
the
meeting was to identify "lessons learned" for state agencies, DOE, and
Nordion (the shipper of cobalt-60). We all agreed that this shipment,
although it wasn't a real emergency, was an "off-normal" shipment
because:
(1) it occurred during a high national security threat level, (2) was a
very
high curie shipment, (3) occurred during the Oakland port closure, (4)
was
an international shipment, which raised security issues for DOE, and,
(5) as
indicated by DHS rad health experts, was of concern because of its
potential
attractiveness as a terrorist target. DHS said that the two trucks
should
not have been allowed to park just anywhere awaiting the outcome of the
dock

strike.

This shipment raised several issues including the need for revised notification and communication protocols for "off normal" shipments. Routinely, the shipper (Nordion) notifies the CHP in advance of all shipments; they notify the DHS and the CHP for shipments who's destination is in California, but not for shipments, such as this one, that just transit California. The truck drivers phone in every two hours to Nordion, day or night, on the shipment location. The drivers only stop for meals, restrooms and tire checks, with no sleepover stops. When they need safe parking, Nordion will contact local authorities or the state police for consultation on safe parking. Nordion has not yet predesignated safe parking locations. The CHP is working with Nordion to clarify Nordion's notification and safe parking protocols for future shipments.

DOE-Oakland asked why DHS wasn't involved in decisions regarding locating a secure parking area for the shipment, and they wanted verification, while the decisions on safe parking were being made, that the CHP contacts were actually from the CHP. They also were concerned that this could be a "Trojan Horse", and it concerned their security people that the trucks were being allowed to park at their facilities. DOE agreed to harbor the shipment overnight and store it at LLNL, but was concerned that agreeing to do this might set a precedent for other shipments nationwide. DHS, however, pointed out the need for a reciprocal relationship between DOE and the States on safe parking locations, since at times DOE may need to park DOE shipments at state facilities.

Potential liability issues were identified. Nordion said that they are ultimately responsible for the shipment and were very concerned that at times they were out of the coordination loop on where the shipment was being taken for safe parking. The truck drivers indicated that their procedures were to coordinate with Nordion, but that coordination didn't happen and Nordion lost track of the shipment between two-hour notifications.

DOE would like clarification on which agencies and contacts in the State DOE should coordinate with on these kinds of decisions. We provided them with the contacts and phone numbers for our California Nuclear Waste Transport

Working Group, the OES Warning Control Center 24-hour number (1-800-852-7550) as well as names and numbers for the meeting participants.

As a result of the meeting, the following actions will be taken:

1. The CHP plans to develop notification protocols for "off-normal" shipments; the CHP agreed to contact DHS, OES, CPUC-Rail Safety and the CEC to keep them in the information loop for "off-normal" shipments.
2. DHS recommended that criteria for "off normal" shipments include:
 - (a) accidents or incidents involving greater than highway-route-controlled quantity (HRCQ) radioactive material shipments;
 - (b) significant delays (greater than 8 hours?) of an HRCQ shipment;
 - and (c) shipments that have had significant media attention or notoriety.
3. The CHP will use the OES' 24-hour Warning Control Center phone number for communicating with State agency contacts; Ben Tong from OES is updating their contact list.
4. DOE will provide us with their safe parking protocols for weapons shipments by truck as a possible model for these shipments;
5. Safe parking protocols for WIPP shipments will also be considered;
6. We'll continue to work through our California Nuclear Waste Transport Working Group in developing these protocols.

The agencies have an excellent working relationship with one another and we all agreed that we will continue to communicate among ourselves when these "off normal" shipments occur. The CHP thanked DOE for their help with this shipment. DOE was appreciative that they could meet with the state agencies to discuss this shipment.

Barbara Byron
654-4976